Developments in the Law of Evidence by Goodman, Sophia et al.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1992
Developments in the Law of Evidence
Sophia Goodman
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, sgoodman@indiana.edu
Henry C. Karlson
Kathleen M. Mulligan
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Goodman, Sophia; Karlson, Henry C.; and Mulligan, Kathleen M., "Developments in the Law of Evidence" (1992). Articles by Maurer
Faculty. Paper 531.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/531
Developments in the Law of Evidence
HENRY C. KARLSON*
KATHLEEN M. MULLIGAN**
SOPHIA C. GOODMAN***
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to alert Indiana practitioners to significant
1991 developments in the law of evidence. The Article first discusses
Indiana developments. It then briefly highlights Seventh Circuit and United
States Supreme Court decisions of note.
I. INDIANA DEVELOPMENTS
A. Hearsay
Perhaps the most momentous change in Indiana evidence law in 1991
was the Indiana Supreme Court's announcement in Modesitt v. State, of
the abandonment of the exception to the hearsay rule first enunciated in
Patterson v. State.2 In Patterson, the Indiana Supreme Court sought to
prevent a "misapplication" of the hearsay rule that occurs when out-of-
court statements are excluded even though the concerns underlying the
hearsay rule about the availability of cross-examination are not implicated.3
The court ruled that out-of-court statements need not be excluded as
substantive evidence when the declarant is present and available for cross-
examination at trial.4 The court noted that a then newly adopted Federal
Rule of Evidence required that the use of such statements be conditioned
additionally upon their having been given under oath, but concluded that
this safeguard is unnecessary. 6 In Modesitt, the Indiana Supreme Court
abandoned the Patterson rule and held that
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J.D., 1968; LL.M., 1977, University of Illinois.
** Law Clerk to the Hon. Sarah Evans Barker. B.A., 1987 (magna cum laude),
Marquette University; J.D., 1990 (cum laude), Harvard University.
*** Law Clerk to the Hon. S. Hugh Dillin. A.B., 1985 (summa cum laude), Bryn
Mawr College; J.D., 1990 (summa cum laude), Case Western Reserve University.
I. 578 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 1991).
2. 324 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 1975).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 484-85.
5. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A).
6. Id.
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from this point forward, 7 a prior statement is admissible as sub-
stantive evidence only if the declarant testifies at trial and is
subject to cross examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is (a) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and
was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (b) consistent
with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive, or (c) one of identification of a
person made after perceiving the person. 8
In so holding, the Indiana Supreme Court essentially adopted the language
embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). 9
The State had charged Modesitt with molesting his girlfriend's daughter
at a time when the three of them were living together. The prosecutor's
first three witnesses at trial were the victim's mother, a welfare caseworker,
and a psychologist. "All three witnesses were permitted to testify, over
objection, as to what the victim had told each of them concerning what
Modesitt had done to her.... Only after this testimony was completed
was the victim called to testify."' 0 The victim corroborated most but not
all of the reported acts of molestation. She was not asked whether she
had made the statements testified to by the three prior witnesses or whether
the statements were true.
In its discussion, the Indiana Supreme Court first asked whether the
Patterson rule had been abused." The court concluded that it had because
the victim's charges were repeated by three witnesses before the victim
was called to testify and because the prosecution had failed to lay a
foundation for the three witnesses' testimony by asking the victim whether
she remembered making the statements.' 2 In analyzing whether abuse of
the rule had occurred, the court discussed Patterson and subsequent cases
that refined and qualified its rule. 3 The court concluded that the rationale
7. The Indiana Supreme Court expressly ruled that this decision should not have
any retroactive application to pending or previously decided cases. Modesitt v. State, 578
N.E.2d 649, 654 (Ind. 1991).
8. Id. at 653-54.
9. The only difference between the two formulations is that the federal rule
explicitly states that it applies if the declarant testifies at trial or hearing, whereas the
supreme court's formulation in Modesitt only mentioned a declarant's testimony at trial.
It seems unlikely that this serves as a meaningful distinction between the two rules.
10. Modisett, 578 N.E.2d at 650.
11. Id. at 651.
12. Id. at 651-52.
13. Id. at 651.
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behind those cases was that reliability was safeguarded by the availability
of the declarant at trial.' 4 The abuse in the instant case, however, occurred
because the victim was not available for cross-examination until after her
statements had been repeated by the three witnesses. 5 The court stated,
"We believe that immediate cross examination is the most effective, and
that delayed cross examination is the least effective."'' 6 Writing in the
negative, the court held that it could not find that "the drumbeat rep-
etition" of the victim's story did not unduly prejudice the jury.' 7
The court's discussion did not end there. The court went on to
announce that the Patterson rule should be overruled.' Although main-
taining the validity of the original rationale motivating the adoption of
the rule, that relevant and sufficiently reliable evidence should be presented
to the jury, the court nonetheless observed that in the sixteen years since
Patterson was decided, "numerous decisions by courts throughout this
State have confused the application and clouded the original purpose of
the rule."' 19 The court listed a number of refinements that had been drawn
in various cases following Patterson2 and concluded that "Patterson is
no longer recognizable because of the grafting onto it of additional
requirements and limitations. ' '2' Again defending the rationale behind
Patterson," the court turned to an examination of the practice in other
jurisdictions and focused on Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) as a "well-
considered approach that constructs workable guidelines for allowing prior
statements to be used during trial."' 2 In so ruling, the court apparently
abandoned the position expressed in Patterson that the oath requirement
in Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is unnecessary. 24
The question practitioners face at this point is where to look for
guidance in interpreting this new aspect of state law on hearsay. Before
the adoption of Patterson, prior inconsistent statements could be introduced
not as substantive evidence, but to impeach25 or to refresh recollection, 26
and prior consistent statements could only be used to rehabilitate. 27 The
14. Id.
15. Id. at 651-52.
16. Id. at 651.
17. Id. at 651-52.
18. Id. at 652.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 652-53.
23. Id. at 653.
24. Patterson v. State, 324 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind. 1975).
25. Id. at 488 (DeBruler, J., dissenting); Adams v. State, 314 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ind.
1974); Lee Bros., Inc. v. Jones, 54 N.E.2d 108, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 1944) (en banc).
26. Patterson, 324 N.E.2d at 488 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
27. Carroll v. State, 338 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1975).
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use of prior inconsistent statements subject to the conditions specified in
Modesitt is unprecedented in Indiana law. The nearly verbatim adoption
of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) suggests that federal precedent will
be a useful source of guidance. Indiana courts have referred to federal
practice occasionally when resolving Indiana evidentiary issues. 2 In any
event, practitioners will be forced to resort to these decisions until Indiana
courts have the opportunity to construe Modesitt. However, in the absence
of any pronouncement by the Indiana Supreme Court, federal decisions
can be useful, but not binding, upon Indiana courts. 29
The hearsay exception for statements against penal interest was adopted
in Thomas v. State.30 After summarizing past English and federal experience
with the use of such statements,' the court noted its approval of Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which allows the admission of statements
exculpatory of the accused and inculpatory of the declarant when cir-
cumstances corroborate the trustworthiness of the statement.32 "This rule
[804(b)(3)] serves to assure a defendant his due process right to present
evidence in his favor while protecting the trial court's ability to exclude
evidence that is irrelevant or insufficiently trustworthy.' 3
Following this approach, the court reversed the defendant's conviction
because the defendant was not allowed to present the admissions of guilt
of another suspect in the same crime. 4 The court distinguished Partlow
v. State35 and Taggart v. State,36 in which statements against penal interest
were not admitted because of the absence of circumstances corroborating
the statements. 37
28. See, e.g., Hensley v. State, 573 N.E.2d 913, 917-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(comparing federal practice under Fed. R. Evid. 410 in determining proper use of statements
made in plea discussions); Baker v. Wagers, 472 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(discussing Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) in analyzing business records exception in Indiana).
29. Hamilton County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Smith, 567 N.E.2d 165, 170 n.2
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ("Court decisions interpreting federal statutes with similar language
and purpose as the state statute under consideration, while not binding on this court,
may aid us in construing the state statute.").
30. 580 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1991).
31. Id. at 225-26.
32. Id. at 226-27.
33. Id. at 226.
34. Id. at 227.
35. 453 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072 (1984).
36. 382 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. 1978).
37. Thomas v. State, 580 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind. 1991). The Thomas opinion left
open the important question of what degree of corroboration will be required in order
for a criminal defendant to be permitted to introduce an exculpatory statement made by
an unavailable third party. Constitutional questions may arise if too high a standard is
used. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973). Some courts, however, have required a high degree of corroboration and excluded
1216 [Vol. 25:1213
EVIDENCE
B. Confrontation Clause
A second major development in Indiana evidence law also occurred
in the context of a child molestation case. At issue in Brady v. State"8
was the admission of the alleged victim's testimony, which was videotaped
in her home in the presence of the judge, the prosecuting and defense
attorneys, the victim's mother, an investigator, and an equipment oper-
ator.39 The tape was subsequently played for the jury at trial.
This procedure was done pursuant to and in compliance with section
35-37-4-8 of the Indiana Code. ° During the roughly two hour videotaping,
the defendant was stationed in the garage of the home where the child
was testifying. The defendant could see and hear the child through closed
circuit television, but the child could neither see nor hear him and was
unaware of his presence. The defendant could communicate with his
attorney, who was in the house, through a microphone hook-up.
The defendant contended that section 35-37-4-8 was unconstitutional
on its face because it infringed upon his right, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution4' and article I, section 13
of the Indiana Constitution, 42 to confront the witnesses against him.4 3
After summarizing those two provisions, the Indiana Supreme Court noted
exculpatory statements. See United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).
38. 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991).
39. Id. at 984.
40. At the time of Brady's trial, this statute provided that the prosecutor could
move for a court order either to have a child's testimony taken outside the courtroom
and transmitted in by closed circuit television, with questioning by both the prosecutor
and the defense attorney transmitted to the child in like fashion, IND. CODE § 35-37-4-
8(b) (1988), or to have the testimony videotaped before trial, id. § 35-37-4-8(c), the method
used in this case. Neither procedure was available unless the conditions specified in Indiana
Code § 35-37-4-8(d) were met, including that some sort of evidence be presented as proof
that testifying in court would be a traumatic experience for the child. In those instances
where the videotape procedure of Indiana Code § 35-37-4-8(c) was used, subsection (f)
delineated those persons who were allowed to be in the same room as the child, including,
"[t]he defendant, who can observe and hear the testimony of the child without the child
being able to observe and hear the defendant. However, if the defendant is not represented
by an attorney, the defendant may question the child." Id. § 35-37-4-8(0(7). If the court
ordered that either the procedure in subsection (b) or (c) be used, then only the judge,
the prosecuting attorney, and the defense attorney or the pro se defendant could question
the witness. Id. § 35-37-4-8(g).
41. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ).
42. IND. CoNsT. art. I, § 13 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face ....
43. Id.
19921 1217
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that it had upheld a prior version of this statute44 under both provisions
in Miller v. State,45 but that the current statute was significantly different. 46
The court first addressed the challenge brought under the federal
Constitution. Relying on Delaware v. Fensterer4 7 and Maryland v. Craig,"
the court concluded that "the defendant's opportunity for cross-exami-
nation has been interpreted as being the essential purpose of the federal
confrontation right. ' 49 The Indiana Supreme Court noted the United States
Supreme Court's conclusion in Craig that sometimes the state's interest
in protecting the child witness from trauma will justify permitting the
child to testify out of court and outside the presence of the defendant.5 0
The court then compared Indiana's statute to the Maryland statute at
issue in Craig, found them similar in most respects, and concluded that
Indiana Code section 35-37-4-8 "as written, when tested by the Sixth
Amendment, would be constitutional if construed to also include the Sixth
Amendment requirement that such trauma stem from testifying in the
presence of the accused, since the statute permits the witness to testify
without being able to see or hear the accused." 5' The court said that the
Indiana statute, which does not specify how the defendant is to see and
hear the witness, will satisfy the federal Constitution if this is done via
closed circuit television.5 2 Also passing federal constitutional muster is the
Indiana provision whereby the court might prevent the child from seeing
and hearing the defendant while the child testifies. 3
The one dissimilarity between the Indiana and Maryland statutes noted
by the Indiana Supreme Court is that the Maryland statute did not
authorize the use of statements videotaped before trial.54 The court con-
cluded, however, that the difference in the two methods of presenting
the child's testimony does not affect the balance struck in Craig between
the state's interest in protecting the child witness and the Confrontation
Clause.5
44. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1988).
45. 517 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1987). The Miller court held the taped statements in that
case inadmissible, however, for a failure to provide an opportunity for cross-examination.
46. For example, the statute analyzed in Miller did not contain the equivalent of
the closed circuit television procedure in Indiana Code § 35-37-4-8(b) (1988), and the
Miller statute required "corroborative evidence of the act that was allegedly committed
against the child" before a videotape could be admitted into evidence. IND. CODE § 35-
37-4-6(d) (1988).
47. 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam).
48. 110 S.Ct. 3157 (1990).
49. Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 985 (Ind. 1991).
50. Id. at 986.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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The outcome of the analysis under the Indiana Constitution was
different. The court stated that "[a] face-to-face meeting occurs when
persons are positioned in the presence of one another so as to permit
each to see and recognize the other. '5 6 Although the court recognized
that the Confrontation Clause of the federal Constitution and article I,
section 13 of the Indiana Constitution have much in common, the court
found that Indiana's provision "has a special concreteness and is more
detailed. ' 57
Focusing on article I, section 13 alone, the court proceeded to catalogue
a number of limits on the right to a face-to-face meeting: it can be
waived, it does not apply when a deposition is taken, and it does not
exist with respect to witnesses other than those called by the prosecution. 5
Furthermore, in cases of necessity, the right will not preclude the subsequent
use of testimony when there is a prior face-to-face meeting at a hearing
or trial with an opportunity to cross-examine the witness before the trier
of fact in the same case.59
The court then discussed prior cases which "exemplify [the] Court's
tradition of recognizing that Indiana's confrontation right contains both
the right to cross-examination and the right to meet the witnesses face-
to-face."' ' The two rights are not co-extensive.
The Indiana Constitution recognizes that there is something unique
and important in requiring the face-to-face meeting between the
accused and the State's witnesses as they give their trial testimony.
While the right to cross-examination may be the primary interest
protected by the confrontation right in Article I, § 13 of the
Indiana Constitution, the defendant's right to meet the witnesses
face to face cannot simply be read out of our State's Constitution. 6
The Indiana Supreme Court then cited federal cases to demonstrate
that face-to-face confrontation is an important part of the Sixth Amend-
ment as well. Indeed, although the United States Supreme Court upheld
the closed circuit television procedure used in Craig in light of the state's
interest in protecting the child witness, 62 four members of the court
dissented. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Scalia argued, "Whatever
else it may mean in addition, the defendant's constitutional right 'to be
confronted with the witnesses against him' means, always and everywhere,
56. Id. at 987.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 988.
61. Id.
62. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3170 (1990).
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at least what it explicitly says: the 'right to meet face to face all those
who appear and give evidence at trial.' ' 63
Federal case law aside, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that
subsections (c) and (f)(7) of section 35-37-4-8 violated article I, section
13 of the Indiana Constitution. 64 However, the court found that the
remainder of the statute was left in administrable form. 61 In particular,
when testifying in court in the presence of the accused will be a "potentially
traumatic experience" for a witness 6 (although how much so the court
did not specify), a procedure for receiving a child's testimony and trans-
mitting questions via closed circuit television when the witness can see
the accused and the accused can see and hear the witness will not offend
the right to meet the witness face to face.67
Shortly after Brady was decided, the Indiana Supreme Court faced
the question in Hart v. State" of whether a conviction must be reversed
because of the admission at trial of the pre-recorded videotaped testimony
of an alleged child victim. The court concluded that the failure to provide
the defendant with a face-to-face meeting with the witness was not fun-
damental error when the videotaped testimony of the child is "remarkably
consistent with traditional judicial fact-finding procedures." 69 The witness,
the court noted, was previously videotaped in the courtroom, and although
the defendant was not there, the jury was able to view the witness's
movements on tape in order to assess credibility. 0 Accordingly, because
the error was not fundamental and because the defendant did not spe-
cifically object at trial, the conviction was affirmed.7'
C. Cross-Examination and Impeachment
During 1991, Indiana courts dealt with a number of interesting issues
pertaining to the examination of witnesses on the stand and permissible
uses of testimony given outside the courtroom.
In Pelican, Inc. v. Downey,72 the First District Court of Appeals
explored when impeachment should be allowed and the circumstances
63. Id. at 3172 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016
(1988)).
64. Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 988 (Ind. 1991). These two subsections of
the statute provided for the pre-trial videotaping of testimony and that the child witness
would not be able to see or hear the defendant.
65. Id. at 988-89.
66. Id. at 989.
67. Id.
68. 578 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. 1991).
69. Id. at 337.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 567 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
1220 [Vol. 25:1213
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under which a witness is considered hostile so that the proponent may
ask leading questions. Downey sued The Pelican restaurant after a Coke
glass shattered and severely lacerated his left hand while he was at the
restaurant. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to allow it to ask leading questions on direct
examination in order to impeach a witness with prior inconsistent state-
ments. The witness was Kelly Whitehead, a woman seated at Downey's
table at the time of the incident, and the prior statements she allegedly
made to her supervisor were that she had observed the incident (contrary
to her direct testimony), that Downey was intoxicated and had slammed
the glass on the table in anger, and that she intended to lie about the
events and to testify that the glass was overturned when a waitress knocked
the table.73
With respect to the issue of whether leading questions should have
been allowed, the court of appeals noted that Whitehead's testimony on
direct that she had not witnessed the accident did not exculpate Downey.74
A witness is considered hostile when her testimony exculpates the opponent
and the witness has admitted, explained, or denied the prior statement.75
Whitehead's testimony was that she had not seen the accident; this did
not exculpate Downey. 76 Moreover, the fact established on the record that
Whitehead was a close friend of Downey was also insufficient to show
that she was a hostile witness when called by the appellant.7 Accordingly,
the court of appeals found that the trial court had not abused its discretion
in refusing to allow leading questions. 71
As to whether impeachment should have been allowed, the court of
appeals stated that "[a] witness may be impeached when he shows his
hostility during examination and his friendliness to the opponent, and is
informed of the time and place of his contradictory statement so he may
admit or deny it."'79 The court emphasized that "it is not necessary that
one's witness be declared hostile before commencing an impeachment." 0
In this case, the court of appeals noted that because Whitehead denied
making the statements, they could not be admitted as substantive evidence."
Because the statements could only be used for impeachment purposes,
and because they were cumulative of the testimony of another witness,
73. Id. at 849.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 850.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 849 (citation omitted).
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 850.
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the court of appeals ruled that the appellant was not prejudiced by their
exclusion.Y The court also quoted a Nebraska decision that stated:
[Tlhe rule allowing a party to impeach his own witness may not
be used as an artifice by which inadmissible matter may be revealed
to the jury through the device of offering a witness whose tes-
timony is or should be known to be adverse in order, under the
name of impeachment, to get before the jury a favorable extra-
judicial statement previously made by the prior witness. 83
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals concluded that it "refuse[d]
to reverse the trial court to permit improper use of the impeachment
rule. , ,184
Although Indiana courts have previously dealt with the issue of a
witness's competency to testify when the witness is under the influence
of drugs or intoxicating liquor at the time of the incident about which
the witness was to testify,8 in Boyko v. State,16 the Third District Court
of Appeals dealt with the relatively novel issue of a witness's competency
when he is under the influence of narcotics at the time of his testimony.Y
Boyko was on trial for murder. While incarcerated the night before he
was to testify, Boyko took an antidepressant.
The court of appeals observed that other jurisdictions generally do
not apply a per se incompetency rule for witnesses who have used drugs. 8
"These authorities have generally required a demonstration of impairment
of one of the essential elements of competency before reversal is war-
ranted."18 9 Following this approach, the Third District Court of Appeals
noted that "[a] witness is competent if he has sufficient mental capacity
to perceive, to remember and to narrate the incident he has observed and
to understand and appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath." ' 9t
The trial court would be reversed only upon a showing of a "manifest
abuse" of discretion. 91
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting State v. Keithley, 418 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Neb. 1988)).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 445 N.E.2d 92 (Ind. 1983) (marijuana use); State v.
Kubiak, 4 N.E.2d 193 (Ind. 1936) (alcohol consumption). These decisions have treated
such situations as raising credibility rather than competency issues. Boyko v. State, 566
N.E.2d 1060, 1062 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
86. 566 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
87. Dicta in Kubiak, did suggest that intoxication at the time of testimony might
raise competency issues. Kubiak, 4 N.E.2d at 193-94.
88. Boyko, 566 N.E.2d at 1062-63.
89. Id. at 1063.
90. Id. at 1062 (citation omitted).
91. Id.
1222 [Vol. 25:1213
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In a one paragraph analysis, the court of appeals concluded that
Boyko had not made the requisite showing with respect to the elements
of competency. 92 The court of appeals noted that the trial court had held
a hearing to determine the extent of Boyko's incompetence. 93 Testimony
from this hearing indicated that the drug taken by the defendant would
remain in his system anywhere from eight to twenty-four hours after
consumption.94 The trial judge then continued the trial until sixteen hours
had passed from when Boyko took the drug. 95 The defendant wished to
take the stand despite his recognition that he was a bit groggy. Although
the court of appeals did not touch upon each of the elements of com-
petency, it noted that Boyko "testiffied] in a lucid, coherent manner." 96
Applying a deferential level of review, the court of appeals found no
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 97
In Kelley v. State,9 the court of appeals dealt with the question of
whether the trial court erred in prohibiting the defendant in a child
molestation case from presenting testimony of the victim's prior false
reports of sexual molestation." The court noted that Indiana's rape shield
Iaw'0° does not bar this type of evidence because it "goes to the victim's
credibility, not her history of sexual conduct."' 01
Kelley wanted to question the mother of the victim about a prior
occasion when the victim had accused a schoolteacher of molesting her.' 2
"Evidence of false allegations of similar sexual misconduct is admissible
on the subject of the victim's credibility so long as the allegations are
demonstrably false." 103 Upon questioning by the trial judge, defense counsel
acknowledged that he did not have evidence that the victim admitted the
falsity of the prior allegations or that the accused teacher had been tried
and acquitted.1 4 Without elaborating on what other circumstances, if any,
would satisfy the "demonstrably false" requirement, the court of appeals
found that the evidence was properly excluded.105
92. Id. at 1063.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 566 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
99. Id. at 592.
100. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (1988).
101. Kelley, 566 N.E.2d at 593.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
1992]
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
D. Privileges
1991 also brought forth developments in the law of privileges. The
principal ones were as follows.
1. Psychologist-Patient; Social Workers.-In Jorgensen v. State,'0 6
the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed an important exception to the psy-
chologist-patient privilege. In this appeal of a conviction for murder and
conspiracy to commit murder, Jorgensen claimed that Cochran, not she,
had murdered her husband. The evidence adduced at trial included tes-
timony that Cochran had told a friend that he wanted to kill the victim. 07
The trial court was also aware of Cochran's written confessions to the
murder, although Jorgensen ultimately chose not to offer them into ev-
idence because the trial court denied her motion to redact certain portions
of them. 06
The alleged error discussed by the supreme court was the trial court's
denial of the defendant's request to take the depositions of a social worker
and a psychologist she claimed had counseled Cochran and to whom she
thought Cochran might have made incriminating statements. The supreme
court first declared itself unaware of any privilege applicable to the social
worker. 09 Then, with respect to the psychologist, to whom a privilege
does apply, it pointed out that any information possessed by him that
"relate[d] directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of [the] homicide"
would meet a statutory exception to the psychologist-patient privilege and
was therefore discoverable."10 Finally, the supreme court held that the trial
court should have allowed the defendant to conduct some discovery of
the two counselors for the purpose of ascertaining whether they possessed
any information material to the defense."' The supreme court explained
106. 574 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 1991) [hereinafter Jorgensen 11].
107. Id. at 916.
108. Jorgensen v. State, 567 N.E.2d 113, 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter
Joregensen 1], aff'd, 574 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 1991).
109. Jorgensen II, 574 N.E.2d at 917.
110. The privilege and the exception referred to are found at IND. CODE § 25-33-
1-17 (1988), which provides:
A psychologist certified under this article may not disclose any information
acquired from persons with whom the psychologist has dealt in a professional
capacity, except under the following circumstances:
(1) Trials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate
circumstance of said homicide....
111. In so holding, the court was applying the familiar test for ruling on a criminal
defendant's discovery requests: if (1) the defendant makes a "sufficient designation of
the items sought to be discovered" and (2) the items are "material to the defense," then
the court must grant the discovery request unless (3) "the State makes a showing of
paramount interest in non-disclosure." Kindred v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1161, 1174 (Ind.
1989). The first element was clearly satisfied because the defendant had specified "the
identity of those persons she wished to depose." Jorgensen II, 574 N.E.2d at 917.
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that to deny Jorgensen's request on the ground that she had not shown
the evidence she sought would be material, without first allowing her
some opportunity to conduct discovery, placed her in an impossible "catch-
22" situation."2
2. Physician-Patient.-In Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v.
Trueblood,"' the First District Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff
claiming unnecessary surgeries is not permitted to discover the medical
records of other patients of the same doctor who underwent similar
surgeries during the relevant time period."4 Trueblood brought suit against
the hospital for negligent hiring and supervision of the staff physician
who operated on her. She sought the other patients' records in order to
show actual or constructive knowledge by the hospital of the doctor's
misconduct. The court held that there could be no compelled discovery
of the medical records of nonparty patients who had not waived their
privilege, regardless of the measures taken through redaction to prevent
disclosure of the nonparty patients' identities."'
3. Self-Incrimination.-In Lock v. State," 6 the Indiana Supreme Court
addressed the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.1 7 Lock
testified voluntarily at her first trial, which ended in a mistrial, but chose
not to testify at her second trial and was convicted. On appeal, she
claimed that the trial court violated her Fifth Amendment privilege when
it allowed the prosecutor to introduce as evidence at the second trial her
testimony from the first trial, portions of which she later came to regret.
The supreme court agreed that in testifying at her first trial the
defendant had not waived her Fifth Amendment privilege for purposes
of her second trial and therefore could not be forced to testify at her
second trial." 8 The court found nonetheless that the admission of her
first-trial testimony did not violate her Fifth Amendment privilege." 9 It
recited the hearsay exception that makes prior recorded testimony ad-
missible and then stated that her first-trial testimony was admissible "in
112. Jorgensen II, 574 N.E.2d at 917. It is possible, however, that the court would
not so readily have allowed a fishing expedition had Cochran not, on other occasions,
spoken and written of his involvement in the murder because this evidence provided some
basis for believing that his social worker or psychologist might also have received such
information from him.
113. 579 N.E.2d 1342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
114. Id. at 1346.
115. Id. In so holding, the court was interpreting Indiana Code §§ 34-1-14-5(3)
(physician-patient privilege) and 16-4-8-3 (limitation of access to medical records).
116. 567 N.E.2d 1155 (Ind. 1991).
117. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .....
118. Lock, 567 N.E.2d at 1160.
119. Id. at 1160-61.
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the same manner as a statement or admission against interest given prior
to a trial is admissible at a later trial even if the defendant chooses not
to testify at such trial."' 1"
4. Attorney-Client.-There were two decisions of note in 1991 con-
cerning the attorney-client privilege. In Korff v. State, 12 for the first time,
the Indiana Supreme Court held that an attorney's communication to his
client of the date, time, and place of a hearing is not "confidential" and
therefore, is not privileged.' 22 Thus, when the defendant was charged with
failure to appear at his trial for battery with a deadly weapon, the trial
court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the
testimony of his former attorney that the attorney had informed the
defendant of the date, time, and place of his trial.' 23
Second, in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Blakesley, 24 the Third
District Court of Appeals held that when a client admits that he received
advice from his attorney concerning a transaction, he does not waive his
attorney-client privilege with respect to the content of the discussion.125
Therefore, the trial court did not err in preventing the client's former
attorney from testifying about the advice he gave to his client, even though
the client had admitted on cross-examination that he had obtained advice
from his then attorney. 26
E. Presumptions
Collins v. State'27 involved an appeal from a conviction under section
9-12-3-1 of the Indiana Code for operatirig a motor vehicle after suspension
of a driver's license for being a habitual traffic violator.' The Indiana
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court committed fundamental error in
using the following final instruction:
Evidence that a letter properly addressed, stamped and deposited
in the U.S. Mail is prima facie proof that the letter was received
by the person to whom it was addressed. Whether the denial of
120. Id. at 1160. The court did not indicate whether it ultimately relied on the
hearsay exception for prior testimony of a witness or the exception for admissions of a
party-opponent, or both. A principal difference between the two is that under the admissions
exception the unavailability of the declarant is irrelevant. See 13 RoBERT L. MILLER,
INDIANA PRACTICE § 801.423, at 132 (1984) [hereinafter INDIANA PACTICE].
121. 567 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 1991).
122. Id. at 1148.
123. Id. at 1147.
124. 568 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
125. Id. at 1059.
126. Id. at 1058-59.
127. 567 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. 1991).
128. Id. at 799.
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receipt by the person to whom the letter was addressed is sufficient
to overcome the prima facie case is for the trier of fact to determine
from all of the evidence.
"Prima facie evidence" means such evidence as is sufficient
to establish a given fact and which will remain sufficient if
uncontradicted.'2 9
Because this instruction could reasonably be construed as stating that
proof of mailing constituted proof of receipt, thereby shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant, the supreme court found that it created an
impermissible mandatory presumption. 30
F. Expert and Opinion Testimony
Four 1991 decisions on the subject of expert and opinion testimony
are worthy of note. Two concern the lay opinion rule and two address
expert testimony.
1. The Lay Opinion Rule.-The lay opinion rule "generally demands
that a nonexpert witness testify only to facts known to the witness; the
witness' opinions or conclusions are generally inadmissible."' 3' In Hum-
phries v. State,3 2 the Fourth District Court of Appeals applied this rule
in curious ways.
Humphries involved the appeal of a conviction for disorderly conduct
under the Indiana statute that provides: "A person who recklessly, know-
ingly, or intentionally: ... (2) makes unreasonable noise and continues
to do so after being asked to stop ... commits disorderly conduct .... I"
At trial, the State's only witness was the arresting officer, who testified
that when he stopped the defendant, Humphries "became belligerent,"
"began to curse at [him] and the other officers," and was requested twice
to "quiet down" or else face arrest for disorderly conduct. 34 Instead of
complying, the defendant became "more agitated" and "continually asked
why he had been stopped.'13 The officer then began to "consider himself
to be in physical danger."' 3 6 The court of appeals concluded that the
129. rd. at 801. In order to establish the offense of driving after having been
adjudged a habitual traffic violator, the State must prove the defendant's knowledge of
his or her suspension as a result of this status. Id. at 800; State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d
963, 968 (Ind. 1989).
130. Collins, 567 N.E.2d at 801. The conviction was affirmed, however, because
the defendant's objection was not timely, and the court found the error to be harmless
in light of other evidence admitted. Id.
131. 13 INDIANA PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 701.101, at 3.
132. 568 N.E.2d 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
133. IND. CODE § 35-45-1-3 (1988).
134. Humphries, 568 N.E.2d at 1035.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1036.
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officer's statements about the defendant's "manner of speech, demeanor
and conduct" were improper lay opinions, but noted that the defendant
had not raised this objection at trial. 37 The court then declared that
although admitted without objection, these statements alone could not
sustain the conviction because they did not constitute "substantial evidence
having probative value" of guilt.38 The court reasoned that since lay
opinions are inadmissible because they have no probative value, the state-
ments supplied no evidence of guilt. 39
Ultimately, however, the court affirmed the conviction, finding other
evidence of guilt in the record. It held that the officer's testimony that
he had twice asked the defendant to "quiet down" or face arrest created
inferences of two of the elements of disorderly conduct as defined in the
statute: first, it suggested that the defendant had been speaking unrea-
sonably loudly; second, it suggested that he had been asked to stop doing
so."4 Moreover, the court said, the fact that the officer later arrested the
defendant created an inference that the defendant had continued to speak
unreasonably loudly.' 4'
The court's analysis is problematic in several respects. First, the court
remarked that lay opinions are inadmissible because they lack all probative
value. The usual view in Indiana and elsewhere is that lay opinions are
excluded for reasons of judicial economy.' 42 If the court had recognized
the actual rationale underlying the lay opinion rule, it would merely have
found that the defendant, having failed to require the State to introduce
facts from which the jury could draw its own conclusions about the
defendant's demeanor, had waived his right to object to the State's
establishing those conclusions directly by the introduction of otherwise
inadmissible lay opinion testimony. In other words, instead of finding
that the officer's conclusory statements about the defendant's "manner
of speech, demeanor and conduct" were altogether unprobative, the court
would have found that they proved the very conclusions which they
embodied.
Even under this approach, however, a court should have found that
the evidence of the defendant's "manner of speech, demeanor and con-
duct" did not sustain his conviction. Whereas the Humphries court reached
this conclusion by labeling this evidence not probative, it failed to see
an even more basic problem with it. The officer's statements that the
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1037.
139. Id. at 1036.
140. Id. at 1037.
141. Id.
142. 13 INDIANA PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 701.101; JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRiALs AT CoMMoN LAW § 1918 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
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defendant "cursed at" him, was "belligerent," and was "agitated" say
nothing about whether the defendant engaged in the conduct prohibited
by the statute, that is, whether he made unreasonable noise. A better
analysis, therefore, would have been to find these statements immaterial.
An additional problem with sustaining the conviction on the basis of
statements about the defendant's cursing and belligerence is that these
connote content, rather than volume. A conviction on the basis of these
statements alone would raise serious First Amendment concerns that could
perhaps be overcome, but would have to be addressed. 43 The Humphries
court recognized that a person stopped by the police has a right under
the federal and Indiana Constitutions "to question and argue with the
police." ' '" The court refused, however, to admit that this right may have
been abridged in this case. 45
The Humphries court's final error was to treat the officer's statement
that he had to ask the defendant to quiet down as evidence that the
defendant was speaking unreasonably loudly. The court should have in-
ferred from this statement only that in the officer's opinion the defendant
was speaking unreasonably loudly. It is ironic that having misapplied the
lay opinion rule to find certain of the officer's statements insufficient to
support the conviction, while ignoring the fact that those opinions were
in any case not relevant to guilt, the court then affirmed the conviction
by finding a different statement relevant to guilt, while failing to recognize
it as an impermissible lay opinion.
In contrast, the supreme court in Tunstill v. State'4 displayed a clear
grasp of the lay opinion rule, vacating Tunstill's sentence for voluntary
manslaughter. 47 The supreme court disapproved of the sentencing court's
consideration of Tunstill's prior arrests as an aggravating circumstance
under the statutory provision allowing sentence enhancement for "a history
of criminal or delinquent activity."'14 The supreme court concluded that
143. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972) ("The constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language
not within 'narrowly limited classes of speech."').
144. Humphries v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1033, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Norwell
v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 16 (1973)).
145. Id. These First Amendment issues were addressed directly in Brown v. State,
576 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), which found no constitutional violation and held
that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for disorderly conduct, when
the evidence showed the defendant became loud and abusive after his arrest for receiving
stolen property and when the words used clearly fell within the "fighting words" category
of unprotected speech. Id. at 605-07.
146. 568 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 1991).
147. Id. at 547.
148. IND. CODE § 35-38-1-7(b)(2) (1988) (since repealed but replaced with identical
language now found at IND. CODE § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(2) (Supp. 1991)).
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"[tihe act of placing a person under arrest indicates only a belief, albeit
strong, that the arrested person is guilty of a crime, but does not itself
constitute a determination of the historical fact of that person's guilt."' 4 9
2. Expert Testimony.-A case decided by the Fifth District Court
of Appeals addressed the problem of allowing a judge to testify as an
expert in a malpractice action arising from a case over which he had
presided as judge. In Cornett v. Johnson,'5  a client sued his attorney
for negligently failing to present certain evidence in a divorce proceeding.
The trial court in the malpractice case allowed the judge in the divorce
proceeding to testify for the client that the attorney's omission was the
proximate cause of the harm alleged in the divorce court's division of
the marital property.
On appeal, the Fifth District held that the appropriate standard for
proximate cause under these circumstances is what the "reasonable judge"
(rather than the actual presiding judge) would have done if the attorney
had presented the evidence. 5 ' The court reasoned that an objective standard
is dictated both by general principles of proximate cause and by policy
concerns in the particular situation of a judge testifying as an expert.5 2
These concerns are the danger of prejudice to one party from the possibility
that the judge may appear to side with the other party or may create
an appearance of impropriety in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct,'
and the court's fear of opening the door to the reconvening of a jury
to be questioned as to how it would have resolved a case if the evidence
had been different." The court did not address the manner in which a
party would prove what a reasonable judge would have done. Perhaps
this would require calling a judge as an expert witness.
Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock' addressed a novel
issue concerning expert testimony and hedonic damages. In this wrongful
death action, the court of appeals held that an expert economist's testimony
as to the value of the decedent's life is inadmissible as an aid to the
jury in determining the loss of affection, love, parental training, and
guidance to the surviving spouse and children. 56 The court found that
149. Tunstill, 568 N.E.2d at 544. The supreme court then noted, however, that
prior arrests are relevant at sentencing under the catch-all provision, IND. CODE § 35-38-
1-7(d) (1988) (since repealed but replaced with identical language now found at IND. CODE
§ 35-38-1-7.1(d) (Supp. 1991)). The court reasoned that committing a crime despite prior
brushes with the law indicates an undeterrable character. Tunstill, 568 N.E.2d at 545.
150. 571 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
151. Id. at 575.
152. Id.
153. See INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2(B).
154. Cornett, 571 N.E.2d at 575.
155. 578 N.E.2d 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
156. Id. at 682.
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the jury needed no expert assistance in valuing these losses; thus, the
testimony invaded the province of the jury.'1
Finally, two 1991 cases on the subject of expert psychiatric and
psychological testimony are significant. In Lowrance v. State,15 the court
of appeals made clear that Indiana still allows expert testimony on a
criminal defendant's sanity, despite the prohibition against legal opinions. 5 9
Then, in Byrd v. State,'6 the court of appeals held that a psychiatrist
could testify that in his opinion the results of a Minnesota Multi-Phasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI) test showed that the defendant's personality
profile was inconsistent with the knowledge element of his murder charge.'6'
A subtle distinction between the sanity and the mens rea rules as
revealed by these two cases is that in Lowrance the court said an expert
may give his opinion of the defendant's sanity directly, whereas in Byrd
the court stressed that the expert could not properly testify that in his
opinion the defendant had not satisfied the knowledge element. Instead,
the expert in Byrd could only testify that in his opinion the MMPI results
already in evidence were inconsistent with the knowledge element.
G. Novel Scientific Evidence
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in a case of first impression,
addressed the question of the admissibility of DNA evidence to identify
the perpetrator of a crime. Hopkins v. State'62 quoted the three-prong
version of the Frye test 63 given in a New York state court opinion on
the admissibility of DNA evidence.'6 Hopkins held that DNA evidence
157. Id.
158. 565 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
159. Id. at 378. See generally 13 INDLANA PRAcTICE, supra note 120, § 704.102
(Supp. 1991) (contrasting Indiana and federal law).
160. 579 N.E.2d 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
161. Id. at 461. The Byrd court also held that a psychiatrist could testify that the
defendant might legitimately be suffering from retrogade amnesia, when the State had
repeatedly challenged the defendant's claim that he could not remember. Id. at 461-62.
162. 579 N.E.2d 1297 (Ind. 1991).
163. So named after Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
164. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). In Castro, the New
York court described the Frye test in the context of DNA evidence as follows:
Prong L Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scientific community,
which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable
results?
Prong I. Are there techniques or experiments that currently exist that are capable
of producing reliable results in DNA identification and which are generally
accepted in the scientific community?
Prong III. Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific techniques
in analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?"
Id. at 987, quoted in Hopkins, 579 N.E.2d at 1302.
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is admissible as a matter of law because it satisfies the first two prongs
of the analysis, that is, because "the theory and techniques of DNA
identification currently available are generally accepted in the scientific
community as capable of producing reliable results."' 65 The supreme court
based its conclusions on case law and on the record in the case before
it, but noted that these conclusions were in accord with an Indiana statute
concerning DNA evidence that was passed after Hopkins's trial took
place. 16
Hopkins further held:
[O]nce the trial court has ruled the witness qualified as a matter
of law to give expert testimony regarding DNA analysis, subsequent
evaluation of that evidence goes only to its weight as a matter
of fact. Any battle of qualified experts ... or other conflict as
to the reliability of evidence is to be resolved by the trier of
fact.' 67
Thus, the defendant's argument that the testing laboratory had not per-
formed the accepted techniques in this particular case did not affect the
admissibility of the DNA evidence and was an issue to be resolved by
the trier of fact. 68 In so holding, Hopkins differed from the New York
opinion to which it owed the three-prong analysis it applied. The New
York case concluded that the third prong of the analysis must be raised
at a pre-trial hearing before the court. 169
In an interesting concurring opinion, Justice Dickson questioned whether
court determination of the Frye general acceptance standard (prongs one
and two of the test) should be a prerequisite to the admissibility of expert
testimony. 70 Justice Dickson noted that many courts and commentators
have suggested that after a determination by the court that the expert is
qualified and his evidence relevant, all questions concerning the reliability
165. Hopkins, 579 N.E.2d at 1302.
166. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-13(b) (Supp. 1991) (originally enacted in 1990 as IND.
CODE § 35-37-4-10(b)) ("In a criminal trial or hearing, the results of forensic DNA analysis
are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that forensic DNA analysis
provides a trustworthy and reliable method of identifying characteristics in an individual's
genetic material.").
167. Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1303 (Ind. 1991). Accord Davidson v.
State, 580 N.E.2d 238, 243 (Ind. 1991) (citing Hopkins, the court found it unnecessary
to hold an admissibility hearing out of the jury's presence on the issue of whether the
testing laboratory performed the accepted techniques in the particular case because there
was no objection to the qualifications of the experts; any irregularities in the procedures
went only to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence).
168. Hopkins, 579 N.E.2d at 1303.
169. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
170. Hopkins, 579 N.E.2d at 1305 (Dickson, J., concurring).
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of the evidence should be left to the trier of fact. He further urged that
the majority's opinion not be taken to compel the use of the Frye
methodology for the admission of all novel scientific evidence. 71
H. Extrinsic Offenses
The general rule of extrinsic offenses'72 states that evidence of a
defendant's prior misconduct is inadmissible to show that the defendant
is the kind of person who commits crimes and therefore is guilty of the
crime charged. 7 1 In Street v. State,'74 the Fifth District Court of Appeals
provided a useful summary of the law of extrinsic offenses and a detailed
analysis of several exceptions to the general rule.
Street was appealing his conviction for receiving stolen property and
dealing in marijuana to a minor. Street had allegedly given marijuana to
Wright (the minor) in exchange for goods Wright had stolen. The trial
court allowed Wright to testify that a week and a half before the charged
events the defendant had given him marijuana in exchange for some
personal property belonging to Wright. The court of appeals reversed the
conviction, holding that permitting the testimony was reversable error.'
In determining that the minor's testimony with respect to the dealing
charge was inadmissible, 76 the Street court recognized that the traditional
exceptions allowing extrinsic offense evidence to prove a defendant's intent,
motive, purpose, or identity only properly apply when these matters are
at issue in the case.1" That the court accepted this principle is clear from
its holding that the minor's testimony was not admissible under either
the state of mind or the identity exception because the only issue with
respect to the dealing charge was whether the defendant had engaged in
171. See id. at 1307.
172. The Indiana Supreme Court has expressed a preference for this phrase "to
describe a defendant's other crimes, wrongs or acts that remain uncharged in the case
under consideration." Gibbs v. State, 538 N.E.2d 937, 939 n.1 (Ind. 1989).
173. See, e.g., Street v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1180, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
174. 567 N.E.2d 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
175. Id. at 1187-88.
176. The court noted that Wright's testimony was inadmissible to prove the charge
of receiving stolen property because it had no relevance to that charge. The court reasoned
that the only issue with respect to the receiving charge was whether the defendant knew
the goods he accepted from the minor were stolen; testimony about a prior exchange of
marijuana for goods actually owned by the minor, not stolen, was irrelevant to that issue.
Id. at 1185.
177. Without this caveat, the exceptions would swallow the rule. See id. But see
12 INDIANA PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 404.208, at 266-68 (noting that Indiana courts
infrequently exclude extrinsic offense evidence on the ground that intent is not at issue).
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marijuana dealing, not whether he had intentionally or knowingly done
so, or whether the State had arrested the right man. 78
The court then analyzed and found inapplicable the identity and
common scheme or plan exceptions. First, the court concluded that even
if identity had been an issue, Wright's evidence did not satisfy the identity
exception. 179 This was because that exception only makes admissible ex-
trinsic offenses that "share enough unusual, distinctive characteristics to
create a 'signature' of the perpetrator," which the prior exchange in this
case did not. 80
Second, the court stated that to be admissible under the common
scheme or plan exception, the extrinsic offense must be "so related in
character, time, and place of commission as to establish some plan which
embraced both."' 8 ' The court held that this standard was not met merely
because the extrinsic offense evidence showed repetition of the charged
offense close to the same time and place and between the same parties.1 2
It quoted with approval from United States v. Beasley, s3 a Seventh Circuit
case that remarked, "something more than a pattern and temporal prox-
imity is required" because "[tihe inference from 'pattern' by itself is
exactly the forbidden inference."' 1 4 The Street court found that the "some-
thing more" that is needed is a "tangible connection" between the of-
fenses.'
Although the court said that under this approach it would have found
Wright's testimony inadmissible,8 6 it was unable to rest its holding on a
Beasley approach. This was because the Street court found that the Indiana
Supreme Court in Clark v. State'87 "appear[ed] to approve a rule that
in drug cases the required nexus may be shown through evidence of
criminal acts linked only by repetition, provided there is proximity in
time."' 88 Instead, the Street court went on to hold that the common
178. Street, 567 N.E.2d at 1185. See also Haynes v. State, 578 N.E.2d 369, 370
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Street, court found extrinsic drug offenses inadmissible to
prove knowledge and intent when these matters were not at issue).
179. Street, 567 N.E.2d at 1185.
180. Id. at 1184.
181. Id. at 1185 (quoting Gibbs v. State, 538 N.E.2d 937, 939 (Ind. 1989)).
182. Id.
183. 809 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987).
184. Id. at 1278.
185. Street v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1180, 1185-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Clark
v. State, 536 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Ind. 1989)). But see Benefiel v. State, 578 N.E.2d 338,
346-47 (Ind. 1991) (prior attacks on other women admissible under common scheme or
plan exception, in addition to other reasons, where prior attacks were merely similar to
charged events and where, though six and eight years prior to it, they were deemed not
to be too remote).
186. Street, 567 N.E.2d at 1186.
187. 536 N.E.2d 493 (Ind. 1989).
188. Street, 567 N.E.2d at 1186.
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scheme or plan exception was not satisfied because the testimony failed
to establish any plan by the defendant to deal in marijuana.8 9 Wright's
testimony showed that, during the second transaction with the defendant,
Street offered to buy the stolen goods and in the end traded marijuana
for the goods only at Wright's suggestion.'90
In contrast with the extended and largely lucid discussion of extrinsic
offenses in Street, the supreme court's discussion in Guenthensperger v.
State'9' was cursory and somewhat obtuse. In Guenthensperger, the de-
fendant was convicted of murdering his wife by shooting her. The supreme
court upheld the trial court's admission of evidence that seven years
earlier, when the couple was having difficulties and the wife was staying
with friends, the defendant visited her. 92 While talking with her, he fired
a gunshot that hit a wall about five feet from where his wife sat.
The supreme court's rationale for finding the evidence admissible
consists of a series of rules of general applicability. Apart from citations,
and an explanation that prior assaults and threats are no less admissible
than prior batteries, that rationale reads, in its entirety:
Evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible to show intent,
motive, common scheme or plan, or identity. Evidence of a
defendant's prior assaults, batteries, or threats against a homicide
victim is admissible to prove motive. We have also said that
motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime. Identity was
an issue in this case because appellant filed a notice of alibi and
claimed that he was not the person who perpetrated the crime. 93
This analysis leaves much to be desired. For example, it is difficult
to grasp why the prior incident tended to prove a motive for a crime
that occurred seven years later. Moreover, the statement "motive is always
relevant in the proof of a crime" does not explain why motive evidence
is admissible in this case. If the statement means that motive is always
provable, there would be no need for the general rule of extrinsic offenses
or any of the other exceptions to it because prior bad acts would always
be admissible in criminal trials? 94 A final problem with the court's analysis
189. Id. at 1187.
190. Id. It is this finding that makes Street reconcilable with Hawn v. State, 565
N.E.2d 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), a recent case which held admissible the prior drug
dealings of a defendant charged with later drug offenses, where the uncharged acts occurred
within a year of the charged ones, "and the circumstances tended to prove a common
scheme or plan of drug dealing." Id. at 365.
191. 566 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. 1991).
192. Id. at 62.
193. Id. (citations omitted).
194. Johnson v. State, 260 N.E.2d 782 (Ind. 1970), which Guenthensperger cites
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is that the court's description of the two incidents fails to establish the
"signature" or "modus operandi" normally required to make an extrinsic
offense admissible to show identity. 95
A new statute adopted by the Indiana legislature in 1991 adds pro-
cedural burdens for certain uses of the extrinsic evidence rule. 96 The
statute first states that in trials for battery, aggravated battery, murder,
and voluntary manslaughter, "evidence of a previous battery is admissible
into the state's case-in-chief for purposes of proving motive, intent, identity,
or common scheme and design."' 97 The prior battery is admissible even
if no charges were filed, 98 but the statute only affects prior batteries less
than five years old.'9
The purpose and effect of these substantive provisions are unclear.
The common-law rules of extrinsic offenses are broader and make all
extrinsic offenses, charged or uncharged, admissible to prove motive, intent,
identity, or common scheme and plan in any trial.m It is clear, however,
that the statute is not intended to restrict the use of extrinsic offense
evidence because it expressly states that it "shall not be construed to limit
the admissibility of evidence of a previous battery in any civil or criminal
proceeding. '"201
On the other hand, the statute may have the effect of expanding the
common-law rules somewhat if, for example, it is interpreted to limit
judicial discretion to find irrelevant and hence inadmissible a four-year-
old battery committed under different circumstances from the charged
offense. However, such interpretations would probably be incorrect, given
that the statute only makes the prior batteries admissible "to prove"
for the proposition that motive is always relevant in the proof of the crime, clearly did
not mean that motive is always provable. After stating the proposition in the shorthand
way copied by Guenthensperger, Johnson then elaborated by quoting an expanded statement
of the rule which specifies that motive must be in issue. Id. at 785.
195. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221 (Ind. 1991) (evidence of prior murder
admissible under "identity/modus operandi" exception in trial for murder and child
molesting, when in both cases victims were young, black girls who were walked away by
a man and a woman to a secluded area, when both died of asphyxia by strangulation,
when pieces of a bedsheet were found at the scenes of both crimes, and when strips of
cloth from both victims' shirts were found tom into strips and knotted); Byrd v. State,
579 N.E.2d 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (evidence that defendant killed enemy troops in
Vietnam by grinding their faces into the dirt in exactly the same manner as victim was
killed admissible under identity exception). See generally 12 INDIANA PRACTICE, supra note
120, § 404.214.
196. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-14 (1988) (adopted May 12, 1991, and made effective
July 1, 1991, by IND. CODE § 1-1-3-3 1988).
197. Id. § 35-37-4-14(c).
198. Id. § 35-37-4-14(a).
199. Id. § 35-37-4-14(b).
200. See 12 INDIANA PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 404.201.
201. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-14(e) (1988).
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motive. This language appears to leave a court room to find that a prior
battery does not "prove," that is, is not relevant to, motive. Moreover,
because Guenthensperger demonstrates that Indiana courts have no trouble
finding even seven-year-old offenses relevant,2 it is difficult to see the
time provision as an expansion of existing law.
The procedural requirements of the statute are new, however, and
may prove burdensome to the courts. They include a requirement that if
the State plans to use evidence covered by the statute it file a written
notice ten days before trial, together with an affidavit stating an offer
of proof; a requirement that, if the court finds the written offer sufficient
it hold a hearing on the offer of proof out of the jury's hearing; and
a requirement that the court make an order detailing what evidence is
admissible and the type of questions that are permissible. 2 3
I. Real and Demonstrative Evidence
The admissibility of transparent overlays was analyzed in Solomon v.
State,20 an appeal from a conviction for attempted murder, resisting law
enforcement, and criminal mischief. During the trial, both prosecution
and defense used not-to-scale drawings of the streets where the events at
issue took place, with transparent overlays placed on top.205 Both sides
drew markings on the transparencies to indicate various locations and
movements.' Because the overlays were admitted into evidence without
objection, Solomon argued on appeal that the admission of these overlays
constituted fundamental error in that the markings on the overlays, drawn
to illustrate testimony, lacked communicative content in themselves and
hence could not be subjected to appellate review.m
The court of appeals agreed that the overlays lacked communicative
content and were not subject to appellate review but nonetheless found
that their admission did not constitute fundamental error and further
found that it would not likely amount to any error at all.m "Charts and
drawings may be admitted into evidence if they are reasonably accurate
and likely to help a jury understand testimony; such exhibits need not
be perfect representations, and their admissibility is a matter of trial judge
discretion."0 The court reasoned that because drawings and charts could
lack expressive value just as these overlays had and because such charts
202. See supra text accompanying notes 191-93.
203. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-14(d) (1988).
204. 570 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
205. Id. at 1297.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (citations omitted).
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and drawings were not condemned, there was no reason to foreclose use
of the overlays. 210 The court also apparently rejected insusceptibility to
appellate review as a basis for objecting to the admission of exhibits.21'
J. Preserving Error
In 1991, Indiana courts provided guidance to trial lawyers on preserving
error and raising objections in various contexts. Osborne v. Wenger 2
presented the issue of whether the failure to raise a "competency of the
evidence" objection at a deposition results in a waiver of the right to
object at trial to the admission of that portion of the deposition. The
Third District Court of Appeals, in holding that the objection had not
been waived,23 construed the exception to Trial Rule 32(D)(3)(a). That
rule, with its exception, states, "Objections to the competency of a witness
or to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived
by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition,
unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated
or removed if presented at that time. '214
Osborne sought at trial to admit a medical expert's deposition testimony
that Osborne was "uninsurable and therefore unemployable. ' ' 211 Wenger
sought to exclude the testimony on the grounds that the doctor was not
qualified to opine on insurability and that the testimony was prejudicial,
but he had failed to raise these objections at the deposition when the
question eliciting the doctor's opinion on insurability and employability
was asked. The appellate court said the burden was on Osborne to show
that the doctor possessed the necessary credentials to render his opinion
admissible and, therefore, that an objection presented at the deposition
would have "obviated or removed" the ground for the objection. 216
In Smith v. State,2 7 the supreme court found a defendant's continuing
objection sufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of the admissibility
of the fruits of an allegedly illegal search and seizure.21, The trial court
had held a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress in open court
and on the record. At the end of the hearing, the trial court denied the
motion to suppress and granted the defendant's request to show a con-
tinuing objection. The defendant repeated his continuing objection when-
210. Id. at 1297-98.
211. Id.
212. 572 N.E.2d 1343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
213. Id. at 1344.
214. IND. TmiAL R. 32(D)(3)(a).
215. Osborne, 572 N.E.2d at 1344.
216. Id. at 1345.
217. 565 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. 1991).
218. Id. at 1061.
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ever evidence to which it pertained was used by the State. The defendant
did not, however, restate his grounds for objecting; he merely referred
to the grounds "previously raised." In finding this continuing objection
sufficient because it referred to grounds stated on the record in open
court, the Smith court distinguished a defendant's continuing objection
made "for reasons that we previously argued in chambers," which had
been found insufficient in Abner v. State.219
K. Miscellaneous Indiana Decisions of Note
Certain other decisions issued by Indiana courts in 1991 are also
worth mentioning. In Reed v. Dillon, "o the court of appeals held that a
motion to strike a document from the record may remove that document
from the record, but does not bar introduction of the document into
evidence at some later point in the proceedings. 22'
In Smith v. State,n the Second District Court of Appeals dealt with
the issue of whether a juvenile was convicted of robbery based on an
allegedly involuntary confession. The defendant made this confession after
a twenty minute consultation with his mother, after which both he and
his mother signed waivers of their rights. Under Indiana Code section
31-6-7-3(a)(2), the juvenile's rights could be "knowingly and voluntarily"
waived by a mutual act of the juvenile and the custodial parent after a
"meaningful consultation. " 224 In this case, Smith alleged that his mother
misunderstood the ramifications of the statement made to her by police
that Smith's companion, but not Smith, had been identified.2
Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-6-7-3(d)(2), the court treated the
mother's alleged misunderstanding as "a factor affecting the voluntariness
of the confession."226 The court, in evaluating the "totality of the cir-
cumstances," doubted that the mother lacked an appreciation of the effect
of her son's confession and found that the evidence supported the trial
court's conclusion that the defendant's rights were waived. " 7
II. FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Rule 403 Balancing
Two 1991 decisions by the Seventh Circuit describe interesting
applications of the Rule 403 balancing test. 228 In United States v.
219. 479 N.E.2d 1254, 1259 (Ind. 1985).
220. 566 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
221. Id. at 588.
222. 580 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
223. Id. at 300.
224. See IND. CODE § 31-6-7-3(a)(2) (1988).
225. Id. at 300-01.
226. Id. at 300.
227. Id. at 301.
228. The rule provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
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Masters,229 the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to allow the defense to cross-examine a witness
in detail concerning his habit of wearing women's underwear. 20 The
defendants maintained that they were innocent of a woman's murder
and claimed, based on the witness's habit and on the absence of
underpants on the victim, that the witness had killed her for the missing
underpants. After the witness, in response to a defense question, ad-
mitted his habit, the trial judge cut off further questioning.
The Seventh Circuit found that the details of the witness's habit
were properly excluded under Rule 403.23' It reasoned that because there
was no indication that violence was an aspect of transvestism in general
or the witness's habit in particular, the details were "peripheral. ' 1212 The
court of appeals also noted that the defense's theory of the murder was
"hardly... impressive,"' 233 since women's underwear is readily available
for purchase and need not be acquired through murder.
In United States v. Allen,'234 the Seventh Circuit held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 in allowing a government
witness to correct in court her earlier misidentification of the defendant,
which was also given in court. 235 The Seventh Circuit held that there
was no substantial danger of unfair prejudice or of misleading the jury,
where both identifications were made before the jury, where the defense
and prosecution were permitted to explore the discrepancy thoroughly
on cross and on redirect examination, and where there was no indication
that the witness had been coached to change her testimony.236
B. Sequestration of Witnesses
In United States v. Hargrove,237 the Seventh Circuit rejected a de-
fendant's claim that the trial court should have excluded the testimony
of a government witness who was present during the testimony of another
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
229. 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1991).
230. Id. at 1368.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 930 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1273.
237. 929 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1991).
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government witness she was called to contradict because the trial court
had entered a sequestration order pursuant to Rule 615.238 The government
had called Baker, a paralegal present at the FBI's interview of Beckett,
to rebut Beckett's courtroom testimony, which Baker had heard, that
Beckett was coerced to name the defendant as his drug source.
The court found that Baker's testimony did not contravene the
purpose of Rule 615, which "is to prevent witnesses from tailoring their
testimony to that which has already been presented and to help in
detecting testimony that is less than candid."' ' 9 This was because Baker's
testimony was in rebuttal to Beckett's and not in conformance with his,
because Baker did not testify concerning the substance of Beckett's
interview with the FBI but only concerning the lack of coercion during
it, and because the government had no intention of calling Baker until
Beckett asserted coercion on the stand.2m
C. Opinions on the Ultimate Issue
In United States v. Foster,24 the Seventh Circuit addressed the
interplay between Rule 704(b) and expert testimony on drug courier
profiles. The issue at trial was whether Foster knew he was carrying
drugs. The court held that a DEA agent's expert testimony that Foster
fit the drug courier profile did not violate Rule 704(b)'s prohibition on
experts testifying as to whether the defendant had the mental state
required of the crime charged. 242 The court reasoned that the testimony
was permissible because the agent did not specifically opine that Foster
had the requisite state of mind.243 The testimony "merely assisted the
jury in coming to a conclusion as to Foster's mental state [but] did not
make that conclusion for them.
'
"
244
D. Notable United States Supreme Court Decisions
Certain rulings by the United States Supreme Court in 1991 should
also be mentioned. In Arizona v. Fulminante,241 the Supreme Court, in
a five to four decision, announced that the admission of coerced con-
fessions would be subject to a harmless error analysis, based on Justice
238. That rule provides, "At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the
order of its own motion.... ." FED. R. Evm. 615.
239. Hargrove, 929 F.2d at 320.
240. Id. at 320-21.
241. 939 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1991).
242. Id. at 454.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
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Rehnquist's characterization of such errors as "error in the trial process,"
rather than a "structural defect affecting the framework within which
the trial proceeds." 24 In Payne v. Tennessee,247 the Supreme Court
abandoned its previous decisions in Booth v. Maryland"8 and South
Carolina v. Gathers24 9 and held that the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not per se bar the introduction of victim impact
evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial. 0
III. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, a number of evidentiary developments
occurred in 1991. Readers should understand, however, that while the
Article addresses some of the more significant topics, it is not intended
to be comprehensive.
246. Id. at 1264-65.
247. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
248. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
249. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
250. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
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